

AI-Generated Art and The Crisis of Authorship in Contemporary Aesthetics

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Article information

Received: 8th April 2026

Received in revised form: 21st April 2026

Accepted: 25th April 2026

Available online: 3rd May 2026

Volume: 1

Issue: 2

DOI: <https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.20035779>

Abstract

The rapid proliferation of artificial intelligence (AI) image-generation tools such as DALL-E, Midjourney, and Stable Diffusion has precipitated an unprecedented crisis of authorship in the visual arts. This paper examines the philosophical, legal, and aesthetic dimensions of AI-generated art, interrogating whether algorithmic outputs qualify as creative works and who, if anyone, may claim authorship over them. Drawing upon Walter Benjamin's concept of mechanical reproduction, Roland Barthes's declaration of the death of the author, and contemporary debates in computational creativity research, the article argues that AI art does not merely replicate existing aesthetic paradigms but fundamentally reconfigures the relationship between creator, tool, and audience. The analysis engages with landmark cases including the 2022 Colorado State Fair controversy, the U.S. Copyright Office's 2023 ruling on Zarya of the Dawn, and the ongoing litigation between visual artists and generative AI companies. The paper concludes that the emergence of AI art necessitates a revised theoretical framework that moves beyond the Romantic notion of the solitary genius and embraces a distributed model of creativity in which human intentionality, machine computation, and cultural context jointly constitute artistic meaning.

Keywords: - Artificial Intelligence, Authorship, Generative Art, Computational Creativity, Copyright, Aesthetics.

I. INTRODUCTION

In September 2022, Jason Allen's AI-generated artwork *Théâtre D'opéra Spatial* won first place in the digital arts category at the Colorado State Fair, igniting a global debate about the nature of artistic creation in the age of machine learning (Roose, 2022). The controversy was not merely about the quality of the image—which judges found compelling—but about the fundamental question of whether a work produced through textual prompts to an algorithm could be considered art at all. This incident crystallized anxieties that had been building since the emergence of generative adversarial networks (GANs) in 2014 and the subsequent development of diffusion-based models capable of producing photorealistic and stylistically diverse imagery from natural language descriptions (Goodfellow et al., 2014; Ramesh et al., 2022).

The question of authorship in AI-generated art is not merely academic; it carries profound implications for intellectual property law, the economics of creative labor, and the philosophical foundations upon which aesthetic judgment rests. If a machine can produce work that is visually indistinguishable from human-made art, what remains of the Romantic conception of the artist as a uniquely inspired individual? If the training data for these models comprises millions of copyrighted images scraped from the internet without consent, who bears moral and legal responsibility for the outputs (Jiang et al., 2023)?

This paper addresses these questions through an interdisciplinary lens, drawing upon art theory, philosophy of mind, legal scholarship, and computer science. The argument proceeds in four stages. First, the paper situates AI art

within the historical trajectory of mechanical reproduction in the arts, from photography to digital media. Second, it examines the philosophical challenge that AI poses to traditional theories of authorship and creativity. Third, it analyzes the legal landscape, focusing on recent copyright decisions and pending litigation. Finally, it proposes a revised framework for understanding authorship in the context of human-AI collaboration.

II. MECHANICAL REPRODUCTION AND THE ARTISTIC AURA

Walter Benjamin's seminal 1936 essay, "The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction," argued that technologies such as photography and cinema fundamentally altered the status of the artwork by stripping it of its "aura"—the unique presence and authenticity that accrues to a singular, handmade object embedded in a particular tradition (Benjamin, 1969). Benjamin observed that mechanical reproduction democratized access to art while simultaneously undermining the authority of the original. The photograph could circulate endlessly, detached from the spatial and temporal context of its creation, and in doing so it transformed art from a ritual object into a political instrument.

AI-generated art represents a qualitative intensification of the processes Benjamin described. Where photography mechanized the capture of visual reality, and digital tools mechanized the manipulation of images, generative AI mechanizes the act of aesthetic conception itself. The human operator of a diffusion model does not compose, arrange, or even select from pre-existing visual elements in the traditional sense; rather, they articulate a verbal description—a prompt—and the algorithm generates an image through a stochastic process of iterative denoising (Ho et al., 2020). The result is an artwork that has no original in Benjamin's sense: it is neither a copy of a pre-existing image nor a direct expression of human manual skill.

This development has provoked sharply divergent reactions. Defenders of AI art argue that it represents a natural extension of the long history of technological mediation in artistic production, from the camera obscura to Photoshop (Elgammal, 2019). Critics counter that there is a categorical difference between tools that extend human capability and systems that replace human agency altogether. The painter who uses a projector to transfer a composition onto canvas remains the author of the resulting work; the prompter who types "a painting in the style of Vermeer showing a woman reading a letter" into Midjourney arguably does not (Hertzmann, 2018).

III. THE DEATH OF THE AUTHOR REVISITED

Roland Barthes's 1967 essay "The Death of the Author" declared that the meaning of a literary text resides not in the intentions of its creator but in the interpretive activity of its readers. Barthes argued that the figure of the Author was a modern invention, a product of capitalist individualism that obscured the fundamentally intertextual nature of all writing (Barthes, 1977). Michel Foucault elaborated on this critique in "What Is an Author?" (1969), proposing the concept of the "author function"—a discursive construct that serves to classify, delimit, and authorize texts within institutional frameworks (Foucault, 1984).

AI-generated art brings these theoretical arguments into concrete materiality. When a diffusion model generates an image, there is no singular authorial consciousness behind the work. The model's outputs are determined by the statistical patterns extracted from its training data, the architectural constraints of its neural network, the stochastic elements of the generation process, and the prompt provided by the user. Authorship, in this context, becomes radically distributed: it is shared among the engineers who designed the model, the artists whose works constituted the training data, the user who crafted the prompt, and the algorithm itself (Colton et al., 2011).

Margaret Boden's taxonomy of creativity offers a useful framework for analyzing AI-generated art. Boden (2004) distinguished among combinational creativity (novel combinations of familiar ideas), exploratory creativity (the systematic investigation of a conceptual space), and transformational creativity (the alteration of the conceptual space itself). Current AI systems excel at combinational and exploratory creativity—they can generate novel juxtapositions and traverse aesthetic spaces with remarkable fluency—but whether they achieve transformational creativity remains deeply contested. The capacity to recognize that a conceptual space should be altered, and to do so with intentionality, appears to require a form of self-awareness that contemporary AI systems do not possess (Boden, 2004; Colton & Wiggins, 2012).

This raises the question of whether intentionality is a necessary condition for authorship. If we follow Barthes and Foucault in decoupling meaning from authorial intention, the absence of machine consciousness becomes less problematic. The AI-generated image, like the Barthesian text, becomes a site of plural meanings produced through the encounter between the work and its audience. However, this move comes at a cost: if no intentional agent stands behind the work, the ethical and legal frameworks that govern artistic production—copyright, moral rights, attribution—lose their conceptual foundation (Bridy, 2012).

IV. THE LEGAL LANDSCAPE: COPYRIGHT AND AI ART

The legal status of AI-generated art has been the subject of several landmark decisions in recent years. In February 2023, the U.S. Copyright Office issued a ruling on the graphic novel *Zarya of the Dawn*, authored by Kris Kashtanova with illustrations generated by Midjourney. The Office granted copyright protection to the text and the selection and arrangement of images, but denied protection to the individual AI-generated images themselves, reasoning that they were not products of human authorship (U.S. Copyright Office, 2023). This decision drew upon the Supreme Court's holding

in *Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony* (1884), which established that copyright protection for photographs depends on the photographer's creative choices regarding composition, lighting, and arrangement.

In August 2023, a federal court in *Thaler v. Perlmutter* affirmed the Copyright Office's position, ruling that a work generated autonomously by an AI system without human creative input cannot be registered for copyright (*Thaler v. Perlmutter*, 2023). Judge Beryl Howell observed that copyright has always required "human creative expression" and that extending protection to purely machine-generated works would require legislative action. The ruling left open the question of where the threshold of human involvement lies—how much prompting, curation, or post-processing is sufficient to establish human authorship over an AI-assisted work.

Simultaneously, a class-action lawsuit filed by artists Sarah Andersen, Kelly McKernan, and Karla Ortiz against Stability AI, Midjourney, and DeviantArt alleged that the defendants' AI models were trained on billions of copyrighted images without authorization, constituting mass copyright infringement (*Andersen v. Stability AI*, 2023). The case raises fundamental questions about the applicability of fair use doctrine to AI training and the extent to which the outputs of generative models constitute derivative works of their training data (Lemley & Casey, 2021). The outcome of this litigation will have far-reaching implications for the creative industries, potentially determining whether the current model of AI training—which relies on the wholesale ingestion of publicly available data—is legally sustainable.

Internationally, approaches vary significantly. The United Kingdom's Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 already provides for copyright in computer-generated works, vesting authorship in the person who made the arrangements necessary for the creation of the work (CDPA, 1988, s. 9(3)). The European Union, by contrast, has maintained that copyright requires the author's "own intellectual creation," a standard that appears to exclude purely AI-generated outputs (InfoSoc Directive, 2001). China's Shenzhen court ruled in 2019 that an AI-written article was copyrightable, attributing authorship to the company that operated the AI system (*Tencent v. Yinxun*, 2019). These divergent approaches reflect fundamentally different conceptions of the relationship between creativity, labor, and legal protection.

V. TOWARD A DISTRIBUTED MODEL OF CREATIVITY

The foregoing analysis suggests that neither the Romantic model of the solitary genius nor the poststructuralist dissolution of authorship adequately accounts for the complexities of AI-generated art. What is needed is a framework that recognizes the distributed nature of creativity in human-AI systems while preserving the capacity for ethical and legal accountability.

Mazzone and Elgammal (2019) have argued that AI-generated art should be understood as the product of a creative partnership in which the human contributor provides intentionality, cultural context, and evaluative judgment, while the AI contributes computational power, pattern recognition, and generative capacity. On this view, the prompt engineer is not merely a passive consumer of machine outputs but an active participant in a creative process that unfolds through iterative cycles of prompting, evaluation, and refinement.

This framework has the advantage of preserving a role for human agency without requiring that the human contributor exercise manual skill or direct control over every element of the final work. It also provides a basis for legal attribution: the person who initiates, guides, and curates the generative process can be recognized as the author of the resulting work, in much the same way that a film director is recognized as the author of a film despite not personally operating the camera, designing the sets, or performing the roles (Sarris, 1962).

However, the collaborative authorship model must also contend with the rights of those whose creative labor is embedded in the AI's training data. A diffusion model's capacity to generate images "in the style of" a particular artist depends on the incorporation of that artist's work into the training set. The model does not merely learn general principles of visual composition; it learns specific stylistic features that are the product of individual artists' creative development over years or decades (Shan et al., 2023). Any adequate framework for AI authorship must therefore include mechanisms for recognizing and compensating the involuntary contributions of training data artists, whether through opt-out provisions, licensing arrangements, or collective rights management.

VI. ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS FOR THE ART WORLD

Beyond the legal and philosophical dimensions, AI-generated art raises pressing ethical questions about the future of creative labor. The visual arts economy is already characterized by extreme precarity, with most working artists earning well below median income levels (Throsby & Petetskaya, 2017). The advent of AI tools that can produce professional-quality imagery at negligible marginal cost threatens to accelerate the devaluation of human artistic labor, particularly in commercial sectors such as illustration, graphic design, and concept art.

The Writers Guild of America's 2023 strike, which included demands for restrictions on the use of AI in screenwriting, illustrated the extent to which creative workers perceive AI as an existential threat (Koblin, 2023). Similar concerns have been voiced by visual artists, who fear that the widespread adoption of generative AI will reduce demand for commissioned work and erode the market value of human-made art. These anxieties are not unfounded: research on technological displacement has consistently demonstrated that occupations requiring creative and cognitive skills are increasingly susceptible to automation, with the visual arts among the sectors most exposed to AI-driven disruption (Frey & Osborne, 2017).

At the same time, proponents of AI art argue that these tools can democratize creative expression, enabling individuals without formal training or manual dexterity to realize their artistic visions. This argument echoes earlier debates about the democratizing potential of photography, desktop publishing, and digital music production. The challenge, as with these earlier technologies, lies in ensuring that democratization does not come at the expense of those who have invested years in developing specialized skills.

VII. CONCLUSION

The emergence of AI-generated art represents a watershed moment in the history of aesthetic production. It challenges the Romantic ideal of the artist as a uniquely inspired individual, complicates the legal frameworks that have governed intellectual property for centuries, and raises urgent questions about the economic future of creative labor. This paper has argued that addressing these challenges requires moving beyond binary oppositions—human versus machine, original versus copy, author versus tool—and embracing a more nuanced understanding of creativity as a distributed, collaborative, and culturally embedded process.

The distributed model of creativity proposed here recognizes that AI-generated art is neither a mere technical artifact nor a fully autonomous creative achievement. It is, rather, the product of complex interactions among human intentions, computational processes, cultural traditions, and the vast archive of human creative expression that constitutes the AI's training data. Acknowledging this complexity is a necessary first step toward developing legal, ethical, and aesthetic frameworks that are adequate to the realities of artistic production in the twenty-first century.

As AI systems become more sophisticated and their outputs more compelling, the questions raised in this paper will only become more pressing. The art world, the legal system, and society at large must engage with these questions proactively, rather than allowing technological development to outpace critical reflection. The future of human creativity may well depend on the quality of the frameworks we construct today.

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